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Abstract
Using advances in text analysis, we examine the content and timing of
21,493 press releases issued by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) between 1994 and 2009. Press releases announcing enforcement
actions or regulatory changes were issued more often on Fridays and be-
fore holidays, a time when news has the least impact on media coverage
and ﬁnancial markets. Changing the timing of press releases may increase
deterrence through awareness of regulation and market reaction to envi-
ronmental news. We ﬁnd no evidence of regulatory capture. We compare
text analysis techniques that allow data collection from sources previously
too expensive to access.
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session.On July 20, 2007, the EPA issued a press release announcing that E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co. would pay $66 million to reduce its sulfur dioxide
emissions after failing to comply with the Clean Air Act.1 One of the goals of
the EPA in releasing information is to provide a deterrent to other potential
violators (EPA Press Director, personal communication, March 31, 2010). It
would seem that this press release was an opportunity to send a message. The
settlement was part of a greater campaign to reduce pollution from sulfuric acid
manufacturers and air pollution generally. However, July 20, 2007, was a Friday,
and Fridays are not a prime day for getting media attention. DellaVigna and
Pollet (2009) document that investors pay less attention to media reports released
on Fridays than to reports released on other weekdays. In addition, it is more
diﬃcult for reporters to follow up with interviews as the weekend begins, making
it less likely that a story will be published at all if a press release is issued
at the end of the week. Anecdotal evidence of government agencies releasing
controversial announcements on Fridays abound.2 DellaVigna and Pollet (2009)
ﬁnd that the president is less likely to sign a non-controversial executive order
or law on a Friday. Gersen and O’Connell (2009) ﬁnd that signiﬁcant rules by
agencies are slightly more likely to be issued on Fridays than insigniﬁcant rules,
and hypothesize that agencies choose the timing to control who the audience is.
To fully exploit the eﬀectiveness of public disclosure as a deterrent to environ-
mental violation as well as promote awareness of environmental regulation, the
EPA must manage both the content and the schedule of its public announcements.
Using all the press releases (over 21,000) available from the EPA newsroom web-
1Environmental Protection Agency. “Du Pont agrees to spend $66 million to reduce air
pollution at four plants.” Accessed June 20, 2011.
2Stephen Engelberg, “The Bad News Hour: 4 P.M. Friday,” The New York Times, April
6, 1984: A20; Cindy Skrzycki, “New Rules Delivered Just in Time for Holidays," Washington
Post, Jan 9, 2007: D1
2site from August 1994 until October 2009, we analyze whether the press release
policy of the EPA maximizes the eﬀects of public disclosure on ﬁrms and the
visibility of regulatory changes. Taking full advantage of such a strategy would
imply releasing news about violations, settlements, and regulatory changes early
in the week, when the public is most attentive, rather than on Friday, when there
is likely less public and media scrutiny. To analyze the content of thousands
of press releases, we employ multiple text analysis techniques. Machine reading
allows us to examine more documents, over more dimensions, than would be possi-
ble with conventional hand-coding. We describe these text analysis techniques in
some detail, as their use in the social sciences literature has been limited. We ﬁnd
that press releases about enforcement actions, which include descriptions of envi-
ronmental violations and resulting punishments, are more often issued on Fridays
and on days before holidays. Press releases mentioning environmental awards are
less likely to be issued on Fridays and on days before holidays. These ﬁndings
are inconsistent with the EPA trying to maximize the impact of the disclosure of
enforcement actions. The EPA also frequently issues press releases about regula-
tory changes. Maximizing publicity for these changes could increase awareness of
new regulations and advertise the EPA’s activities. Consistent with the general
objective of press releases—to increase awareness of regulatory change—we ex-
pect these press releases to appear early in the week. A disproportionate number
of press releases mentioning regulatory changes occur on Friday, however.
Capital markets create important incentives for ﬁrms to reduce pollution. Ex-
amining the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), one of the EPA’s most signiﬁcant
examples of disclosure, Hamilton (1995) found that polluting ﬁrms experience
signiﬁcant negative returns following news about their emissions. He estimated
these losses to be in the millions of dollars. Several other researchers have also
3found a statistically negative eﬀect on stock market performance resulting from
the TRI, including Khanna, Quimio and Bojilova (1998) and Konar and Cohen
(1997, 2001). Reduced stock prices can also translate into reduced pollution;
ﬁrms that experience a large decrease in share price after disclosure of their pol-
lution levels subsequently reduced their levels the most (Konar and Cohen, 1997).
Foulon, Lanoie and Laplante (2002) examine the eﬀect of the publication of lists
of noncompliant companies in Canada, and ﬁnd evidence that public disclosure
strategies provide additional incentives beyond those provided by traditional en-
forcement. Though the EPA controls the format and timing of the TRI, the TRI
necessarily focuses on a narrower set of environmental violations than press re-
leases, which may address any environmental policy. Furthermore, a press release
can reveal diﬀerent details and nuances than TRI data.
The TRI is just one way to disclose environmental information. Researchers
have also analyzed the eﬀect of newspaper articles covering environmental news,
though the results are not clear cut. Bosch, Eckard and Lee (1998) show that
announcements in the Wall Street Journal of environmental violations result in
negative returns for individual stocks. Wall Street Journal announcements of
hazardous waste management lawsuit ﬁlings have a similar eﬀect (Muoghalu,
Robison and Glascock, 1990). Dasgupta, Laplante and Mamingi (2001) also ﬁnd
that stock prices react to environmental news in Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and
the Philippines. Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) ﬁnd a negative response to
environmental incidents and a positive response to environmental recognition or
performance in articles found in the NEXIS newswire database.
Negative environmental incidents reported in the Wall Street Journal involv-
ing oil or electricity companies had no eﬀect on the stock prices of these compa-
nies, however (Jones and Rubin, 2001). Harper and Adams (1996) detect no stock
4market eﬀect for ﬁrms named potentially liable parties in a Superfund cleanup
case. Karpoﬀ, Lott and Wehrly (2005) point out that although there are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant losses from environmental violations on ﬁrms’ market value, these
losses are of the same magnitude as the ﬁnes or penalties paid, suggesting that
there is no reputational eﬀect on stock value from environmental non-compliance.
In this paper, we take as given that disclosure of environmental violations
matters for compliance, and turn our attention to the way that disclosure is
managed. Though the evidence about the eﬀects of environmental news on stock
prices is mixed, there is evidence that ﬁrms beneﬁt from strategically timing the
release of bad news. Firms release bad news after securities markets have closed
(Patell and Wolfson, 1982), later in the earnings quarter (Begley and Fischer,
1998), or on Fridays (DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009; Damodaran, 1989; Bagnoli,
Clement and Watts, 2005). A survey by Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005)
indicates that managers delay bad news to Friday or after hours so that investors
anticipate the news, dampening the decline in the stock price. Therefore, if the
EPA were concerned about protecting ﬁrms from the stock market eﬀect, then
it would release negative news concerning the ﬁrm on a Friday. To examine
disclosure, we use press releases rather than news articles, which have a few
advantages. The EPA neither writes the content for news articles nor decides
when they will be published, as it does with the TRI. The EPA’s control of press
releases allows for more direct policy implications. In addition, we can use all
the available press releases, as opposed to selecting news outlets and articles for
analysis.
Although we ﬁnd that a disproportionate number of press releases detailing
enforcement actions occurred on Friday, we ﬁnd no evidence that the timing of
these releases was inﬂuenced by individual ﬁrms. If the EPA was acting in the
5best interest of ﬁrms (e.g., there is regulatory capture), it would have timed press
releases that can harm the reputation of companies for Friday, so as to minimize
scrutiny. The EPA is not more likely to release information about S&P 500 ﬁrms
on Friday, nor is it more likely to release news disclosing speciﬁc dollar amounts
on Friday. Firms that employed (or retained a lobbying ﬁrm that employed) past
or future EPA staﬀ are not more likely to have Friday press releases, even when
those press releases are about enforcement actions. A limitation of our research is
that we have not yet managed to match company names directly to press releases
with great accuracy. Our estimates for S&P 500 companies estimates likely suﬀer
from measurement error.
Our results suggest that the EPA might achieve more deterrence by tweaking
its press release strategy. Disclosing information about violations earlier in the
week should garner more attention from the public and from the market. We
found no evidence that the EPA avoids this strategy because of lobbying, but it
is possible that other pressures inﬂuence the timing of its news. The EPA often
is a lightning rod for criticism,3 so perhaps certain news items are placed on
Friday to reduce negative attention. If this were the case, then we would expect
the Friday eﬀect to disappear when the political stakes are lower and there is less
concern about negative attention, such as during a presidential lame duck period.
At the end of an administration, appointees may be less concerned about backlash
from controversial announcements. We ﬁnd that press releases on a regulatory
change are not more likely to come out on a Friday during a lame duck period.
The Friday eﬀect is much more pronounced during the same November-January
period in years without an election.
3John M. Broder, “Bashing E.P.A. Is New Theme in G.O.P. Race,”The New York Times,
August 17, 2011
61 EPA Press Releases and Classiﬁcation
We downloaded all press releases from the EPA newsroom website and employed
two diﬀerent computational linguistics methods to identify the content of press
releases. Speciﬁcally, we categorize each press release as to whether it pertains to
enforcement actions, awards, regulatory changes, money, or health. We describe
the dictionary method and machine learning method of classiﬁcation, and brieﬂy
discuss our choice of approach.
1.1 Dictionary Method of Classiﬁcation
Though the use of text analysis techniques in the social sciences dates back sev-
eral decades, reductions in the cost of computing have allowed faster growth in
text analysis in recent years. Typically, a social scientist creates a “dictionary"
of words or phrases that are indicative of certain information being present in
text. A computer algorithm then searches the text for the words in the dictio-
nary. The dictionary method is also known as a “bag of words" approach since
it models a document as a collection of words, without regard to their ordering.
Researchers have used this technique to identify the politics of parties and news-
papers. Laver and Garry (2000) analyze words in party manifestos in Ireland to
obtain policy positions of the parties that match the assessment of the parties’
positions by political experts. By examining the choice of words and phrases
such as “Death Tax" and “War on Terror," Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) deduce
a newspaper’s political leaning. Others have analyzed news articles to identify
their stock market eﬀects. Tetlock (2007) analyzes the choice of words in Wall
Street Journal articles and shows that the proportion of negative words as deﬁned
by the dictionary has the ability to predict stock market returns over the follow-
7ing two or three days. Hanley and Hoberg (2010) document that an abundance
of boilerplate language leads to underpricing of ﬁrms’ initial public oﬀerings.
For each category of press release (enforcement, awards, regulatory changes,
money, or health), we deﬁned a list of words, or dictionary, that was likely to
signify membership in one of these categories. To classify press releases that refer
to enforcement actions we created a dictionary that included phrases such as
“penalize," “prosecute," or “ﬁnes," and selected any press release that contained
one or more phrases from the dictionary. We created a dictionary of phrases such
as “commend,” “grant,” or “achievement” to identify press releases that announced
awards. To ﬁnd content referring to regulatory changes, we created a dictionary
including such phrases as “Federal Register,” “ﬁnalize,” and “new rule.” To ﬁnd
press releases that mentioned money, we used a dictionary that contained only
a dollar sign ($). To locate press releases discussing health eﬀects, we chose a
longer list of words associated with health, such as “fatal,” “cancer-causing,” or
“asthma,” For each category we created dummy variables indicating that at least
one of our dictionary words (or symbols) appeared in the press release. Our
complete dictionaries for each topic are available in the appendix.
While the dictionary approach is simple to understand and implement, it has
some important limitations. First, the choice of words for the dictionaries is
rather arbitrary. Second, the method assumes that the occurrence of one word
is independent of other words. There are many words with multiple deﬁnitions
and connotations, of which only one meaning is of interest. One particularly
troublesome word for our paper is “ﬁne,” which we would have wanted to include
in an enforcement dictionary for its punitive connotation. Unfortunately, it is
also a word frequently used by the EPA in the phrase “ﬁne particulates”. We
therefore have to exclude it from our dictionary, and only use forms of “ﬁne" that
8are likely to have the connotations we want. Loughran and McDonald (2011)
discover a similar problem in the dictionary employed by Tetlock (2007). They
conclude that almost three-quarters of the negative words in the dictionary do not
actually have a negative association in the ﬁnance context. Since dictionaries are
so sensitive to context, and can introduce measurement error, we have explored
these weaknesses and applied additional techniques.
1.2 Machine Learning Approach
Due to the imprecision of the dictionary approach, we employ a second, somewhat
more involved method of classiﬁcation to categorize enforcement, award, and
regulatory change press releases. We borrow a method of text analysis from
computer science: a naive Bayes model augmented with an N-gram language
model (Peng and Schuurmans, 2003). Some economists have used the naive
Bayes approach (Antweiler and Frank, 2004), but the combination with the N-
gram model is newer to economists and we therefore describe it in some detail.
Antweiler and Frank (2004) use a naive Bayesian scheme to classify postings on
internet message boards to estimate their eﬀect on stock returns. The naive
Bayes classiﬁcation assumes that words occur independently of each other. The
scientist starts with a small sample of articles, where the category of each article is
known. The classiﬁer calculates the probability of a particular word occurring in
each category from the small sample. The classiﬁer also calculates the probability
of each word occurring in the set of press releases. Armed with these two pieces of
information and Bayes law, a scientist can classify any article given the words that
appear in the article. Despite its simplifying and obviously incorrect assumption
that the occurrence of one word is independent of the occurrence of another, this
technique performs well.
9Cavnar and Trenkle (1994) observe that classiﬁcation based on the probabil-
ity of character occurrences (such as the occurrence of letters, spaces, and their
sequences) is more robust than classiﬁcation based on full word occurrences. We
use a character-based classiﬁer, or N-character language model, as implemented
in Alias-i [2009] to classify the press release data into diﬀerent categories. The
independence assumption of the naive Bayes model is relaxed by allowing local
Markov chain dependence. The underlying assumption for the classiﬁer is that
the typical sequence of N characters in an enforcement article will be diﬀerent
from the sequence of characters in a non-enforcement article. For example, an
enforcement article is more likely to contain the ﬁve-character sequence “ﬁned"
than an article that does not mention an enforcement action. Unlike the dic-
tionary approach, we do not provide the classiﬁer with an ex ante dictionary of
words. Instead we let the classiﬁer calculate the probability of all sequences of
characters from the annotated articles.
We deﬁne N contiguous characters as N-grams, where an N-gram is a subse-
quence of N characters from the whole sequence of characters in the press release.
For example, if we were to construct N-grams for N  2 from a press release that
only contained the word “ﬁne", there will be seven N-grams—“f," “I," “n," “e,"
“ﬁ,"“in," and “ne." N-grams may identify more common elements in similar press
releases than a word-based classiﬁcation strategy. For example, to model the
probability that the press release mentions an enforcement action, we ﬁrst create
a training set of hand-classiﬁed press releases. Imagine if the training set of press
releases does not contain the word “ﬁned" but only contains the word “ﬁnes"; then
a simple word-based classiﬁcation strategy does not associate the word “ﬁned"
with an enforcement action. However, the N-gram based strategy will associate a
non-zero probability with the conjugation “ﬁned," since it contains “f,"“I," “n,"“e,"
10“ﬁ,"“in,"“ne,"“ﬁn," “ine," and “ﬁne."4
We classify a subsample of press releases by hand, so we know that a press
release with the sequence of characters d = c1c2 :::cK is classiﬁed as type t. By





We approximate each N-gram sequence probability by assuming Markov N-gram
independence. Only the N-1 preceding characters are relevant for predicting the
occurrence of the subsequent character:
P(cijc1 :::ci 1) = P(cijci N+1 :::ci 1) (2)
For each press release of type t in the training set, we calculate the probability
of character sequences occurring based on frequencies of sequences in each type
t. Let mi
i n+1 be the number of occurrences of the N-gram ci N+1 :::ci in press
release type t and M
i 1
i n+1 be the number of occurrences of N-gram ci N+1 :::ci 1
in press release type t. Therefore the observed probability of an N-gram sequence
occurring in type t is calculated as





The observed probabilities of the N-gram sequence occurring in a press release
of type t are stored and used to classify the remaining unseen press releases as
type t or otherwise. That is, say we want to classify an unseen release, with the
4In computational linguistics, it is popular to algorithmically reduce words to root words,
but the approach introduces error as well, e.g., gallery and gall may both be stemmed to gall
(Manning and Schutze, 1999).
11character sequence u = u1u2 :::uJ, as a type t 2 T. We would classify it as the



















^ P(uijui N+1 :::ui 1;t) (6)
where ^ P(uijui N+1 :::ui 1;t) is the probability of each N-gram sequence appear-
ing in the unseen press release. The probability is derived from the observed
probability that the N-gram sequence would occur in the training set categorized
as type t by applying Equation (3). We assign the document to the more probable
type.
2 EPA Press Release Data Description
Our textual data are derived from 21,493 press releases downloaded from the
U.S. EPA newsroom website. For all electronically available press releases from
August 1994 until October 2009, we captured the text of the press release and the
date.5 The number of press releases published online by the EPA has increased
5We also captured the topic categories assigned by the EPA, including agriculture, air,
awards, compliance, emergency, energy, grants, international, partnership, pesticides, radiation,
recovery, research, superfund, trash, underground, water, waste, and other. Inclusion of these
12over time, as shown in Figure 1, from just 149 in 1995, the ﬁrst full year of
data, to 2,088 in 2008. For each press release we created variables for day of the
week, sessions of Congress, lame duck periods, EPA administrators, presidential




































Figure 1: Time trend of number of press releases published on the EPA’s website,
1994 to 2009.
To classify press releases, we randomly selected 150 press releases from our
category dummies in our regressions does not weaken our results, and yields no evidence that
Friday press releases are driven by a single EPA oﬃce. We exclude these variables as they do
not appear to be assigned consistently by the EPA.
6Speciﬁcally, the holidays examined are New Year’s Day, Martin Luther King, Jr’s Birthday,
George Washington’s Birthday, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Columbus Day,
Veterans Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day.
13corpus of all the press releases. For each of the 150 articles, we annotated whether
the article was related to an enforcement action or not; whether the article men-
tioned an award or not; and whether the article was about a regulatory change
or not. We reserved 50 of the 150 articles as “unseen” to test the classiﬁer. The
classiﬁer created all possible combinations of N characters in the 100 training
articles, inclusive of the spaces in the text. Using the information about the
category of each training article, the classiﬁer computed the probability of a par-
ticular sequence of N characters being of the same category and not. We then
created a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the likelihood of the press
release being in the category exceeded the likelihood of its not being in that cat-
egory. Using this method, we created variables indicating whether a press release
was about enforcement actions, awards, and regulatory changes. We applied the
classiﬁer to the group of 50 “unseen" articles and observed that the accuracy for
enforcement is about 87 percent, the accuracy for awards is about 94 percent,
and the accuracy for regulatory change is about 58 percent for n=6 (Table 1). We
ﬁnd that the machine learning algorithm is more accurate in classifying the test
releases than the dictionary approach. The dictionary approach (Table 2) results
in more press releases being classiﬁed into a category than the machine learning
method (for all categories: Reg. Change, Enforcement, and Awards). Nonethe-
less, our regression results for the dictionary approach are similar to those for the
machine learning approach, so we present estimation results using the machine
learning data only.
Table 2 also summarizes the day of the week dummies. Saturday and Sunday
get three percent and two percent of press releases, respectively. Thursday gets
most press releases, with 25.2 percent of press releases. Among weekdays, Monday
gets least press releases, with 14.9 percent of press releases. Friday gets 20.1






Reg. Change 0.5847 0.202
Notes: The ﬁrst column shows the correlation coeﬃcient between 50 hand-coded test press releases and the
machine learning classiﬁcation. The second column shows the correlation between the hand-coded press releases
and the dictionary classiﬁcation. The 50 test press releases are diﬀerent from those used in the training dataset
of the machine learning algorithm.
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Timing and Content Variables for Press Releases
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Monday 0.149 0.356 0 1
Tuesday 0.184 0.388 0 1
Wednesday 0.208 0.406 0 1
Thursday 0.252 0.434 0 1
Friday 0.201 0.401 0 1
Saturday 0.003 0.058 0 1
Sunday 0.002 0.045 0 1
Before Holiday 0.029 0.167 0 1
Reg. Change (Machine Learning) 0.095 0.293 0 1
Reg. Change (Dictionary) 0.151 0.358 0 1
Enforcement (Machine Learning) 0.297 0.457 0 1
Enforcement (Dictionary) 0.492 0.500 0 1
Award (Machine Learning) 0.198 0.398 0 1
Award (Dictionary) 0.356 0.479 0 1
FirmS&P500 0.127 0.332 0 1
FirmEmployed 0.006 0.074 0 1
FirmLobby 0.078 0.268 0 1
Lame Duck President 0.029 0.166 0 1
Non-lame Duck Tue. in Nov. to Jan. 20 0.126 0.332 0 1
Health 0.513 0.500 0 1
Dollar 0.499 0.500 0 1
Word Count 410.201 321.115 9 15,659
Observations 21,493
Notes: Summary statistics for our variables based on the 21,493 press releases issued by the EPA from August
1994 to October 2009.
percent of all the press releases. Looking only at the volume of press releases,
Friday does not appear to be a special day (Figure ﬁg:bwhistogramforASSA).
However, we observe that enforcement actions and regulatory changes are more
likely to be announced on Fridays, while awards are more likely to be announced
on Mondays (Figure 3). “Before Holiday" in Table 2 indicates the press release
15was released on a weekday before a federal holiday. On days preceding federal
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Figure 3: The fraction of press releases for three diﬀerent categories (enforcement,
awards, and regulatory changes) across weekdays.
“Lame duck President" indicates the press release being released during the
lame duck tenure of a president. Almost three percent of press releases in our
sample were released during a lame duck presidential period. “Non-lame duck
Tue. in Nov. to Jan. 20" indicates the same period of time in years without
presidential elections. A little over half of the press releases mention a word from
our dictionary of words pertaining to health, and almost half contain the dollar
symbol, $ (see “Health" and “Dollar" in Table 2). “Word Count" indicates the
number of words in a press release; the average is 410 words.
2.1 Regulatory Capture Variables
We were also interested in whether companies (particularly those with a record of
lobbying) seemed able to inﬂuence the timing of information from the EPA. We
took several approaches to the problem of matching company names to individual
17press releases. First, we generated a dictionary of names of companies that were
part of the S&P 500 between 1994 and 2009. Due to changes in the composition
of the S&P 500 and changes to company names during that time, the number
of company names was close to 2000. We then simpliﬁed the names as much
as possible to make matches with our data more likely. For example, “Kroger
Company" became “Kroger," as this was still a unique identiﬁer of the company,
but was also more likely to be matched to a press release. In some cases, we were
not able to simplify the name; we did not remove “Company" from “Southern
Company," as “Southern" would have had many matches unrelated to “Southern
Company.” We then used this dictionary to develop a dummy variable taking a
value of one if at least one S&P 500 company was mentioned in the press release.
Almost 13 percent of the press releases in our sample contain an S&P 500 ﬁrm
(Table 2).
Another approach was to identify companies that employed current or past
EPA employees. The assumption is that a “revolving door" of employment be-
tween companies and the EPA may signal a particularly close relationship, and
these companies may therefore have more inﬂuence on the timing of disclosure.
We extracted names of companies that had hired current or past employees of the
EPA according to the Center for Responsive Politics’ website.7 In our sample,
0.6 percent of press releases have ﬁrms that employ EPA current or past staﬀ
(Table 2). We also created a list of companies that retained lobbying ﬁrms em-
ploying past or future EPA staﬀ. Each of these lists was used as a dictionary that
generated a dummy variable equal to one if at least one company was mentioned
in a press release. In our sample, 7.8 percent of press releases have ﬁrms that
retained lobbyists with current or past EPA employees.
7U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Revolving Door data is available at Opensecrets.org.
183 Empirical Analysis
We seek to determine the eﬀect of the content of a press release on its timing
of release. To do so, we estimate probit models of the decision to release press
release i on a day that picks up less public attention or not. We estimate a model
where the EPA chooses to release news on Fridays (where the dependent variable
equals 1 if released on a Friday, 0 if not):
Pr(Fridayi) = Pr(0 + 1Enforcementi + 2Awardsi + 3Regulatory Changei
+Xi4 + Zi5 + Di6 + Wi7 + Li8 + i  0)
Similarly, we estimate a model where the EPA may choose whether to release
news on the weekday before a holiday:
Pr(Before Holidayi) = Pr(0 + 1Enforcementi + 2Awardsi + 3Regulatory Changei
+Xi4 + Zi5 + Di6 + Wi7 + Li8 + i  0)
Of interest are the variables indicating whether the press release is about
enforcement actions, awards, or regulatory change. We also control for a vector,
X, which includes variables indicating if the content mentions health or money,
whether an S&P 500 company is mentioned, and whether a company is mentioned
that hired an EPA employee or retained a lobbying ﬁrm that did. Interaction
terms are included in Z, and to control for unobserved period-speciﬁc eﬀects,
administrator dummies (or in some speciﬁcations, year dummies) are in D. Word
count, word count squared, and word count cubed are included in W. We also
include covariates, L, measuring whether the regulatory change occurred during a
presidential lame duck period. This dummy might pick up end of year eﬀects, and
19therefore, we also include a dummy for the same time of year as lame duck periods
(the Tuesday after the ﬁrst Monday in November to January 20) in years that
were not lame duck periods. And i and i account for unobserved idiosyncratic
characteristics of the press release.
4 Results
To see if the content of press releases varied by day of week, we ran probit
regressions with each weekday and the day before a holiday as dependent variables
(Table 3). Friday is distinct from other days in several ways: the Friday probit
and the before-holiday probit were the only speciﬁcations where enforcement
press releases were more likely to be issued, and Friday has the only signiﬁcant
enforcement coeﬃcient over all weekdays. Conversely, awards press releases have
a positive coeﬃcient on Monday through Thursday, and only on Fridays and
before holidays are they signiﬁcantly less likely to be issued. Regulatory changes
are less likely to be announced early in the week and more likely to be announced
later in the week and before holidays. Only on Fridays and before holidays are
there signiﬁcantly more regulatory change press releases issued.
We include word count, word count squared, and word count cubed, which
are all highly signiﬁcant, and suggest a non-linear relationship between length of
press releases and day they are released. The length of a press release may aﬀect
the attention it generates independent of its timing or content. We speculate that
shorter press releases contain less information and therefore garner less attention.
Somewhat larger press releases contain more information, whereas the largest
press releases may contain too much information, about disparate topics, to be
easily digested by the media and the public.
20Table 3: Eﬀect of content on probability of press release by day of week
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Before Holiday
Enforcement -0.007 -0.004 -0.011 -0.000 0.018*** 0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002)
Award 0.006 0.016** 0.009 0.001 -0.030*** -0.005**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003)
Reg. Change -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.055*** 0.011 0.105*** 0.020***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.005)
Word Count 0.039** 0.092*** 0.042** 0.030 -0.389*** -0.062***
(0.015) (0.019) (0.017) (0.023) (0.029) (0.016)
(Word Count)2 -0.008 -0.026*** -0.011* -0.002 0.211*** 0.051*
(0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.014) (0.023) (0.024)
(Word Count)3 0.000 0.002* 0.001 -0.000 -0.027*** -0.013
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.008)
n 21,489 21,489 21,489 21,489 21,489 21,489
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.1489 0.1840 0.2085 0.2522 0.2010 0.0288
Pseudo-R2 0.0018 0.0030 0.0023 0.0003 0.0201 0.0128
Notes: Marginal eﬀects from separate probit regressions. In turn, the dependent variable equals 1 if the news
release occurred on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and the weekday before a holiday. ***
Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level; ** 5 percent level; * 10 percent level. Standard errors shown in
parentheses.
21Table 4: Eﬀect of Content, Firms, and Politics on Probability of Friday or Before-
Holiday Release
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Friday Friday Friday Friday Before Holiday
Enforcement:
Enforcement 0.008 0.026*** 0.031** 0.021* 0.004
(0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.004)
Health*Enforcement -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.029** -0.004
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.003)
Dollar*Enforcement 0.002 0.005 -0.002
(0.014) (0.014) (0.004)
FirmS&P500*Enforcement -0.009 -0.010 0.001
(0.019) (0.019) (0.007)
FirmEmployed*Enforcement -0.044 -0.026 -0.007
(0.074) (0.080) (0.017)
FirmLobby*Enforcement -0.002 -0.001 -0.003
(0.025) (0.025) (0.007)
Awards:
Award -0.010 -0.021* -0.044*** -0.034** 0.000
(0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.005)
Health*Award 0.021 0.018 0.013 -0.008*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.004)
Dollar*Award 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.001
(0.018) (0.018) (0.005)
FirmS&P500*Award 0.014 0.011 -0.002
(0.031) (0.030) (0.010)
FirmLobby*Award 0.003 -0.002 -0.007
(0.039) (0.038) (0.010)
Regulatory Changes:
Reg. Change 0.098*** 0.132*** 0.110*** 0.111*** 0.045***
(0.011) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.010)
Health*Reg. Change -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.058*** -0.015***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.002)
Dollar*Reg. Change 0.004 -0.004 0.003
(0.024) (0.024) (0.008)
Lame Duck*Reg. Change 0.007 0.007 -0.009
(0.045) (0.045) (0.006)
Non-lame Duck*Reg. Change 0.093*** 0.093*** -0.012***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.003)
Other:
Health 0.001 0.014* 0.014* 0.015* 0.009***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003)
Dollar 0.001 0.000 -.010 -0.013 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.003)
FirmLobby .024 0.025 0.005
(0.017) (0.017) (0.006)
FirmEmployed 0.029 0.024 0.013
(0.052) (0.052) (0.020)
FirmS&P500 -0.014 -0.016 -0.004
(0.013) (0.013) (0.004)
Lame Duck President 0.000 0.058*** 0.083***
(0.017) (0.020) (0.016)
Non-lame Duck Tue. in Nov. to Jan. 20 0.001 -0.017* 0.058***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
Word Count -0.340*** -0.338*** -0.335*** -0.322*** -0.051***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.013)
(Word Count)2 0.170*** 0.167*** 0.164*** 0.155*** 0.035*
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.017)
(Word Count)3 -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (.005) (0.005)
EPA Admin. Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes No No
Year Eﬀects No No No Yes Yes
n 21,489 21,489 21,480 21,480 21,480
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.201 0.201 0.201 0.201 0.029
Pseudo-R2 0.047 0.048 0.050 0.068 0.084
Notes: Dependent variable in probit regressions equals 1 if the news release occurred on a Friday (columns
(1)-(4)) and equals 1 if news release occured the weekday before a holiday (column (5)). Eﬀects for EPA
administrators (Jackson, Shapiro, Johnson, Leavitt, Horinko, Fisher, Whitman, McCabe, and Browner) are
included in columns (1)-(3). Of the 21,493 news releases, 4,320 occurred on a Friday and 619 occurred before a
holiday. Marginal eﬀects are reported. *** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level; ** 5 percent level; *
10 percent level. Robust standard errors shown in parentheses.
22In Table 4, we expand our analysis of Friday press releases. The coeﬃcient
for regulatory change is positive and signiﬁcant at the one percent level after
controlling for EPA administrator eﬀects. The coeﬃcients for enforcement and
awards have the same signs as in Table 3 (without controls), but are insigniﬁcant,
as are the variables for health and dollar.
When we include interactions between health and enforcement and awards
and regulatory change, the coeﬃcients on enforcement, awards, and regulatory
change are signiﬁcant. The probability that a press release is released on a Friday
is 20 percent; this probability increases by two to three percentage points when
the press release is announcing an enforcement action, increases when mentioning
health, but decreases when an enforcement action is mentioned. Perhaps the EPA
wishes to publicize its activities to mitigate health eﬀects, or perhaps it couches
its press releases on enforcement in the context of health eﬀects when they are
not issued on Friday.
Awards press releases are less likely to be issued on Fridays. This may be
because giving awards is less likely to generate negative attention for the EPA, or
because the EPA wants to draw attention to awardees, in hopes that other indi-
viduals will follow their example. Again, the subject of health seems to partly de-
termine the timing of awards press releases. After controlling for awards releases
that mention health, the coeﬃcient on awards is signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
The coeﬃcient for regulatory change, though already positive and signiﬁcant at
the one percent level in our most parsimonious speciﬁcation, increases after in-
cluding an interaction with health. Press releases on regulatory change are then
13 percentage points more likely to be issued on Fridays, a 68 percent increase in
probability, after accounting for press releases that also mention health eﬀects.
Similar to enforcement press releases, regulatory change releases issued earlier in
23the week are more likely to mention health eﬀects. Regulatory changes also are
more likely to come out the day before a holiday (whereas awards and enforce-
ment are not statistically signiﬁcant after controlling for covariates). About three
percent of press releases are issued on the day before a holiday, but if the press
release is about a regulatory change, this probability increases by 250 percent.
The inclusion of year eﬀects instead of EPA administrator eﬀects increases the
pseudo R-squared and also accounts for some of the variation in our variables of
interest. Though the coeﬃcients for awards and enforcement are smaller using
year eﬀects, and the signiﬁcance is somewhat less, the same patterns of Friday
releases persist.
Our dollar variable, which indicates that a particular press release contained
at least one dollar sign ($), did not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability
of Friday or before-holiday release. The only signiﬁcant dollar coeﬃcient comes
when dollar is interacted with awards: press releases mentioning both dollar
amounts and awards are more likely to come out on Fridays. It is possible that
a measure of the actual amount of money mentioned would be informative (the
range of dollar amounts is quite large, and includes such things as the price of a
CFL light bulb and the total estimated expenditure of a particular congressional
action). Unfortunately, we have yet to extract a usable measure of the values of
money mentioned.
We ﬁnd no evidence that the timing of EPA press releases varies for major
public companies, companies that employed past or current EPA employees, or
companies retaining lobbying ﬁrms with past or current EPA employees. S&P
500 companies have an interest in how markets perceive them, and information
released early in the week may have greater inﬂuence on market perception. How-
ever, we ﬁnd no evidence that press releases on enforcement actions mentioning
24S&P 500 companies are more likely to come out on Fridays or before holidays.
Companies that retained lobbying ﬁrms with past or current EPA employees,
and companies that employ past or current EPA employees, have the desire and
perhaps the ability to inﬂuence EPA actions, yet press releases on enforcement
actions mentioning these companies are not more likely to appear on Fridays or
before holidays. Firms do not seem to eﬀectively inﬂuence the timing of EPA
disclosures, though it is possible that they inﬂuence the content of press releases
in unobserved ways.
We also test whether EPA press release patterns are diﬀerent during presi-
dential lame duck periods (Election Day to Inauguration Day in the years when
a new president is inaugurated). The president appoints the administrator of
the EPA, and therefore during this time, the outgoing administration would have
less accountability to the public. If there is less fear of public reaction to press
releases during lame duck periods, we would expect the Friday eﬀect we observed
on regulatory changes to be less pronounced. To assess whether the timing of
regulatory press releases is diﬀerent during presidential lame duck periods, we in-
teract an indicator for lame duck periods with an indicator for regulatory change.
There are typically more regulation changes during lame duck times (Cochran,
2001; Loring and Roth, 2005; Davies and de Rugy, 2008; Brito and de Rugy,
2009), so we include a dummy for whether the release was during a lame duck
period. Because lame duck periods always fall during a particular time of year,
we compare them to similar November-January periods when the president was
not replaced. We ﬁnd that regulatory change releases during lame duck times are
not more likely to occur on a Friday or before a holiday, corresponding to the hy-
pothesis that the EPA is minimizing public reaction to potentially controversial
news.
255 Conclusion
Using machine learning techniques, we identiﬁed the content of EPA press releases
along several dimensions. We analyzed which information the EPA was most
likely to release on Fridays, a day of the week notorious for receiving the least
attention. Non-controversial press releases, such as releases announcing awards,
are timed to receive more media and investor attention than more controversial
press releases such as enforcement actions (after controlling for health-related
information) or press releases announcing regulatory changes.
These ﬁndings suggest that there may be scope for improving the communi-
cation of regulatory actions, increasing the reaction of capital markets to envi-
ronmental violations, and increasing the visibility, and therefore the deterrence,
of enforcement actions. Future work could match company names from press
releases directly to their stock performance, and quantify the eﬀect of timing for
environmental violations. Another possible research avenue would be to match
press releases to subsequent media coverage to determine which factors predict
greater attention.
We also compared the accuracy of the dictionary approach and a naive Bayes
N-gram language model in identifying the content of press releases. Text analysis
techniques have broad applicability for economists interested in distilling data
from the details of public policies or social interactions. As these techniques are
just beginning to be used in economics, we attempted to explain clearly their
advantages, limitations, and implementation.
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29A Appendix
Table 5: Comparison of Classiﬁcation by Machine Learning and
Dictionary Approaches
Date Headline Fines Awards Reg. Ch.
H M D H M D H M D
9-May-00 Asthma and Allergen Control Conference and Summit in Dallas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17-Mar-05 Cairo High School Science Club & Biology Students’ Environmen-
tal Outreach Program Receives Presidential Environmental Youth
Award
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
14-Jun-02 1. Stop Sale Order Issued to Missouri Disinfectant Company, 2.
Florida Man, Virginia Real Estate Firm Plead Guilty, 3. Ship’s
Chief Engineer Pleads Guilty to Oil Pollution in Alaska Waters,
4. Two Men Sentenced in Las Vegas for Illegal Waste Discharge
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1-Oct-08 EPA Picks Cleanup Plan for Two Creeks Near Nease Superfund
Site
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
27-Jul-01 EPA Calls for Reports of Ground Water Contamination by Hy-
draulic Fracturing
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
8-Mar-00 Virginia Gets $2.3 Million EPA Grant for Safe Drinking Water 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
29-Jun-04 U.S. EPA Proposes Nonattainment Areas under New Federal Air
Quality Standard
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
12-Aug-98 EPA Advises Car Owners to Keep Their Air Conditioners in Good
Working Order This Summer
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
19-Jan-00 Restroom Supply Company to Pay $13,750 for Not Registering
Product
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
18-Jun-01 Cape Charles/Northampton County Chosen as EPA National
Brownﬁelds Showcase Community
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5-May-03 EPA Orders 28 Facilities to Apply for Biosolids Permit 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
21-Jul-04 Iani Announces Resignation as EPA Region 10 Administrator 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
13-Apr-07 EPA Awards $200,000 to the City of Camden to Establish a Local
Brownﬁelds Job Training Program
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
29-Nov-01 Proposal to Ease Transition from Winter to Summer Grade
Cleaner-Burning Gasoline
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
19-Mar-99 OECA Solicits Public Comments on Enforcement 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
5-May-00 Ten Indicted for Underground Tank Testing Fraud 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
10-Dec-98 EPA Says “Put Mother Earth on Your Holiday Gift List" 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
29-Sep-05 EPA Preserves Program to Minimize Emissions of Nitrogen Ox-
ides
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
9-Apr-09 EPA Withdraws Water Permit Fee Incentive Rule 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
26-Apr-01 Florida Woman Pleads Guilty to Illegal Storage of Chemicals 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
25-Sep-06 EPA Removes 19th Avenue Landﬁll from Superfund List 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1-Dec-98 EPA Orders Companies to Begin Cleanup at Motorola Site in
Phoenix
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
24-Jun-97 Updated Press Oﬃce Call List 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1-Mar-07 EPA Actions Will Assure Air Permitting Programs Run Consis-
tently and Smoothly
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
27-Aug-08 Hanover Water System Operator Receives EPA Regional Award 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Continued on Next Page...
30Table 5 – Continued
Date Headline Fines Awards Reg. Ch.
H M D H M D H M D
19-Oct-00 Huston Township Sewer Joint Authority Receives $186,000 Grant
from the EPA
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
22-Sep-08 New England Experienced Fewer Smog Days during Recent Sum-
mer
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
23-Jun-05 The Republic of Korea Joins Methane to Markets Partnership 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17-Oct-03 U.S. EPA Funds Almond Pesticide Study in Three California
Counties
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
8-Jan-09 January is National Radon Action Month 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
1-Nov-05 Inaccurate Water Pollution Reporting Results in $20,000 Fine
against International Seafoods
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
11-Mar-97 U.S. EPA Creative Settlement Beefs Up Tulare Fire Department
Resources
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
22-Feb-01 Houston Employer Fails to Protect Workers from Asbestos 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
24-Jan-03 Court Finds Defendants Liable for Cleanup of Metal Bank Super-
fund Site in Philadelphia
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
9-Jun-00 Draft Guidance Issued to State and Local Governments to Im-
prove Air Quality
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
13-Sep-05 EPA Administrator to Brief Reporters on EPA Eﬀorts in Gulf
Coast
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10-Apr-08 EPA Awards City of Asheville and Land-of-Sky Regional Council
with with Grants to Revitalize Old Properties
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
2-May-08 EPA Awards City of Spartanburg with Grants to Revitalize Old
Properties
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
18-Feb-09 United States Files Clean Air Lawsuit against Louisiana Gener-
ating
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
1-Apr-05 Second Man Sentenced in Michigan Waste Treatment Facility
Case
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
27-Apr-06 Crittenden County Children Get Cleaner Buses 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
18-May-06 EPA Cites Reilly Industries for Clean-air Violations 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
18-Nov-08 Sierra Club Recognizes EPA Regional Administrator Alan J.
Steinberg for Outstanding Environmental Leadership
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
7-Jan-00 EPA and University of New Hampshire Settle Claims of Hazardous
Waste Violations
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
26-Jan-09 EPA and General Electric Update Hudson Dredging Agreement 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
22-Dec-05 EPA Selects Two New York Communities for Brownﬁelds Grants 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
4-Dec-08 EPA Enforcement in New Mexico Continues to Cut Pollution 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
20-May-09 Take Control of Your Asthma, EPA Advises 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
28-Sep-09 U.S. EPA Administrator Lisa P. Jackson to Visit Bay Area 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
28-Jan-99 Boaters No Longer Allowed to Discharge Sewage in Bay Waters
near East Hampton
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
Notes: H: Hand Classiﬁcation; M: Machine Learning Classiﬁcation; D: Dictionary Classiﬁcation. Only the
headline is listed here; however, classiﬁcation was based on all text in the body of the press release.
31Table 6: Dictionaries
Penalty Penalty Continued Award Reg. Change Health
agreement refuses accolade adjust abdominal
alleged refusing achievement adjusted aﬀect children
allegedly reparation achievements adjustment anemia
arbitration resolution award adjustments asthma
claims ruled awards adjusts blood
complain rules celebrate amend brain
complaint ruling celebrated amended breathing
compliance seize celebrates amends cancer-causing
comply seized celebrating federal register carcinogen
conﬁscate seizes celebration ﬁnal decision cardiac
conﬁscating seizing commend ﬁnal rule children
enforce sentence commended ﬁnalize chronic bronchitis
enforced sentenced commends ﬁnalized confusion
enforces sentences earn ﬁnalizes developmental impairment
enforcing sentencing earned go into eﬀect disease
face settle earns goes into eﬀect diseases
faces settled fellowship into law dizziness
fail settles grant modiﬁcation elderly
failed sued granted modiﬁcations eyes
failing sues grants modiﬁed fatal
fails suing honor modiﬁes fever
ﬁles to pay honors modify headaches
ﬁne trial laud new limit health
ﬁnes violate praise new regulation heart
guilty violated praises new regulations high blood pressure
illegal violation prestigious new requirement human health
illegally violations recognition new requirements illness
indict warn recognize new restriction illnesses
infraction warned recognized new rule immune
infractions warns recognizes new rules ingestion
judgement scholarship new standard inhalation
judgment win new standards internal organs
lawsuit wins reform joint pain
lawyer reformed kidney
limitation reforms lethal
obstructed regulatory changes liver
ordered revise lung
orders revised memory
penalize revises memory loss
penalized revision muscle
penalizes revisions nerve disorders
penalties revoke nervous system
penalty revoked nose
prosecute revokes pregnancy
prosecuted revoking respiratory problems
prosecutes take eﬀect scarring
prosecution takes eﬀect severe burns
punished sleepiness
punishes throat
punishment unconsciousness
refused
32